AF Again 080409

A Time Magazine article asks, “Does the U.S. Have an Exit Strategy in Afghanistan?”
(By Tony Karon Monday, Aug. 03, 2009). Despite politically correct rhetoric it is unlikely that the Western powers have even grasped the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan. The U.S. and those nations it could coerce into and appearance of an international coalition entered Afghanistan without a strategy of victory and no understanding of the country or its people.

Eight years later the U.S. Military still lacks understanding of Afghanistan’s people, culture or history. The military ignored promising diplomatic initiatives when it invaded and began sweeping up everyone with a beard as terrorists. American prisons were soon filled with bearded farmers, street vendors and a few so-called “terrorist.” After a prolonged period of intense foreign interrogation the newly terrorized captives were quietly released back to their country. At home they told their stories of horror becoming local heroes and recruits in growing resistance movements.

To the military resistance was proof of terrorist activity to be destroyed by remote aircraft and massive bombing. Thousand pound bombs were dropped on public telephones suspected of being used by the resistance. Weddings were bombed, villages destroyed and populations became refugees, wintering in the open. The military publicly announced that the civilians deserved what they got for harboring terrorist and the resistance won more recruits. The military can destroy well but is ill equipped for the processes of “nation building” and civil government.

The U.S. military points back to World War Two as proof of its ability to govern civil populations. The truth however is that the GIs who established military governments were in fact draftees and volunteers with civil experience, not professional soldiers. The military governments did provide some civil services but the missions were to secure the military’s rear areas from civil disturbances. These military governments ceded control to local authorities as soon as civil governments could be reestablished.

The present Afghan government, established in the wake of a foreign invasion that overthrew the Taliban’s theocratic government, finds itself in predicament. It must defend its constitution against the foreign invaders it needs for support. In 2002 the newly established government advocated bringing moderate Taliban leaders into the new administration. The foreign military supressed all attempts to negotiate with the shattered Taliban. The Afghan government and its military now must ward off attempts by coalition forces to establish military government in the country. Faced with internal corruption, foreign military dictates and growing resistance the administration has been unable to establish central authority across the country. According to coalition figures, resistance movements now control over half of Afghanistan.

A suggested exit strategy is for the foreign military to back off and allow inclusion of dissent elements, including the Taliban, in governing the country. National police and military must be allowed to secure the nation rather than foreign militaries blundering operations that drive more recruits into resistance.

The only other exit strategy is to follow the British model of three previous failed Afghan invasions, fight on for a while then declare victory and flee Afghan justice.