Questions 092209

The U.S. polmil in Afghanistan is lobbying hard for massive reinforcement to its deteriorating campaign. Resorting to fear mongering the military warns that without an immediate troop “surge” the war in Afghanistan will be lost within a year and al Qaida will have a safe base to launch new attacks against the United States. The military declares that the Taliban now controls much of Afghanistan, are rearmed and fighting with new skills. This brings up a number of questions.

Just what constitutes an American victory in Afghanistan? What are the U.S. strategic goals? Are more American troops to open new fronts or are they to replace withdrawing coalition forces? What is the probability that the central administration will now be able to form an effective government? Will sovereign Afghanistan finally be allowed independent freedom to steer its own course? What is fueling the strength of the Taliban? After torpedoing all Afghan attempts to negotiate in the last eight years will America now allow the Taliban to be included in a national solution? How is the friendless Taliban obtaining new weapons and learning new war fighting skills?

In eight years of American warfare in Afghanistan strategy has been redefine so often that all involved have become confused. The new American commander states "Time matters; we must act now to reverse the negative trends and demonstrate progress," According to the “new” or at least the latest plan all foreign troops will be pulled from the countryside to stabilize cities. Apparently a strategy to claim some quick gains.

This tactic surrenders the countryside to the Taliban. A force of 100,000 troops or even 500,000 is insufficient to secure cities from insurgent recruitment and attacks. It concentrates coalition forces into lucrative targets for insurgent attacks. Coalition reactions, in urban areas will result the disproportionate civilian casualties facilitating even more effective insurgent recruitment. Placing foreign troops in the city also reinforces the appearance that Afghan government officials are little more than American puppets. Such a move publicly tars the America with the responsibility for the rampant government corruption.

Insurgents have two primary sources of weapons, a deep pocket sponsor that ships in weapons or they seize weapons from their opponents. The Taliban has no friends among the surround countries. Iran provides limited support for the insurgency as an American distraction but most of Iran’s weapons go to non-Taliban insurgents. No data is so far published on the number of weapons lost by Afghan security forces (ANSF) or coalition. The Taliban’s improved battlefield performance is probably homegrown by skilled commanders but also may result from eight years of coalition ANSF training.

American troop buildup and increased training of the ANSF will likely be counter productive. More foreign troops will increase public friction and a probable fifth column will be trained within the ANSF. The legitimacy of the Afghan administration is already in question and more American troops will be seen as a continued prop to a failing administration. Wasn’t that the Soviet problem?